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Is Inflation a Monetary Phenomenon Only?  








The publication of the second edition of Fratianni and Spinelli’s Monetary 
History of Italy offers the opportunity to analyze the causes behind the inflation 
pattern in Italy in the three decades preceding the entry of the country in the 
European Monetary Union. The two authors reconstruct the monetary history of Italy 
using the monetarist theory as an interpretation scheme, and assert that the Italian 
experience represents a significant confirmation of the validity of that theoretical 
model.
1 
This paper has two objectives. The first consists in showing the limits of the 
explanation of Italian inflation based on the monetarist theory; the second consists in 
providing an alternative explanation whereby the pattern of Italian inflation basically 
depends on the trend of production costs and on the behavior of companies in 
connection with mark-up definition. This paper is subdivided into two parts. In Part I, 
the summary of the most significant aspects of the monetarist interpretation is 
followed by a review of its weak points. In Part II, an alternative interpretation of the 
evolution of inflation in Italy is presented. 
PART I: A CRITICISM OF THE MONETARIST INTERPRETATION 
1) The Monetarist Interpretation 
 
At first glance, the pattern of inflation in Italy in the last three decades of the 20th 
century seems to confirm the validity of monetarist theories. The strong increase in 
the inflation rate in the ‘70s could be explained by the expansionist monetary policy 
adopted with the purpose of minimizing the costs borne to finance the growing public 
debt. Furthermore, it would appear reasonable to consider the curbing of inflation in 
the ‘80s and ‘90s as the result of the commitment of monetary authorities to pursue 
the objective of price stability.
2 
This interpretation has a limit: it does not explain the reasons behind the exchange 
rate crisis in September 1992 when the Italian lira was heavily devalued and forced to 
                                                                   
1 The influence of Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 1982) is evident. 
2 Inflation rate values are shown in Figure 1.  
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leave the European Monetary System. According to Fratianni and Spinelli, the basic 
cause for the currency crisis is to be seen in the limits of the anti-inflationary 
monetary policy adopted in the ‘80s. Only after the crisis of 1992, the monetary 
authorities decided to adopt a stricter monetary policy as compared to that pursued in 
the ‘80s. Following the adoption of these measures, during the course of the ‘90s, the 
inflation differential between Italy and the other European countries was cancelled. 
Fratianni and Spinelli believe that in the three decades preceding the entry of Italy in 
the European Monetary Union the enforcement of the monetary policy was 
substantially discontinuous. 
According to the monetarist interpretation, in the ‘70s, fiscal dominance  - the 
monetary policy being more accommodating than fiscal policy  - reached striking 
dimensions. Fratianni and Spinelli underline that in those years the monetary 
authorities adopted extraordinary administrative measures including a ceiling on the 
quantity of bank loans and portfolio constraints aimed at cutting the costs of public 
debt financing.
3 Accommodating monetary policy created a vicious circle since this 
favored the expansion of indebtedness compelling monetary  authorities to further 
expand the creation of money, thus causing: "an unprecedented inflationary process 
in peace time in terms of level and persistence as well as a fast succession of deep 
currency crises ."
4  In the ‘80s, after the adhesion of Italy to  the European Monetary 
System, the monetary policy recorded positive changes. Monetary authorities 
acquired a greater independence from the Treasury; administrative ties were 
eliminated. Notwithstanding these changes, in the ‘80s, Italian inflation remained 
significantly higher than that of countries such as Germany, United States and Japan. 
Fratianni and Spinelli believe that this unsatisfactory result is due to the limits of the 
monetary policy adopted in the ‘80s. Bank of Italy made a mistake in implementing 
an anti-inflationary policy based on the stabilization of the exchange rate rather than 
on the control of monetary aggregates. This policy led to an overvaluation of the lira 
exchange rate; this caused the disequilibra at the origin of the exchange rate crisis of 
1992.
5  Fratianni and Spinelli repeatedly underline that the higher Italian inflation in 
the ‘80s is explained by the high growth rate of the quantity of money. They compare 
the data of the 1979-1991 period with those relating to the 1861-1998  period, 
excluding the war years and remark that: 
 
“ - the annual monetary creation in the EMS years exceeds by 2.5 percent that in the 
long run; 
- the average annual inflation in the EMS years is 10.4 percent higher, while that of 
the long term is up 4.4.”(Fratianni and Spinelli (2001), p.490) 
 
                                                                   
3 Fratianni and Spinelli (2001), p. 721. The ceiling of total bank loans established a maximum limit to 
the expansion of bank loans. Portfolio constraints obliged banks to purchase a set minimum volume of 
public securities. 
4 Fratianni and Spinelli (2001), p. 721; see also p. 477. 
5 Fratianni and Spinelli (2001), p. 486.  
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Fratianni and Spinelli believe that Governor Ciampi, who led the Bank of Italy 
between 1979 and 1993, was responsible for not having perceived the limits of a 
foreign exchange rate stabilization policy not combined w ith a strict control of 
monetary aggregates. His responsibilities were even heavier due to the fact that the 
Governor knew the virtuous example of countries such as Germany, Great Britain 
and United States as well as the correct  guidelines worked out by h is predecessor, 
Paolo Baffi.
6 
In the ‘90s, notwithstanding the strong devaluation of the lira, the inflation 
curbing process continued; in the second half of the decade, the inflation differential 
with the most virtuous European countries was eliminated. I n the opinion of Fratianni 
and Spinelli, the merit of this result  - which allowed Italy to enter the European 
Monetary Union  - is to be ascribed to Governor Antonio Fazio. He succeeded Ciampi 
in 1993, and implemented a correct anti-inflationary policy based on the control of 
monetary aggregates from the second half of 1994.
7 The effectiveness of the 
monetary policy is illustrated by the data relating to the variation rate of money 
quantity:  
“The progressive monetary squeeze is shown by the sharp fall in the annual change in 
the M2 aggregate: from 9 percent in 1991 to 7 percent in 1993, to 3 percent in 1995, to -5 
in 1997 and to  -1 in 1998... The monetary squeeze appears even more significant when 
considering the concurrent strong and progressive reduction i n the shares of the 
compulsory reserve required to bring the Italian banking system up to the level prevailing 
in the other European countries...” (Fratianni and Spinelli (2001), p. 528) 
 
Fratianni and Spinelli praise Governor Fazio for having been able to define an 
anti-inflationary policy based on the control of monetary aggregates rather than on 
the exchange rate stability  – this being a consequence of price stability which is to be 
achieved through the control of money quantity. The monetary authorities should 
handle interest rates with the aim of controlling the quantity of money and not of 
stabilizing the exchange rate. On the basis of Governor Fazio yearly reports, Fratianni 
and Spinelli state: 
 
“The reversal of causality between money and exchange rate is unquestionable when 
compared with the pre-Fazio era, when price stability was depending on foreign exchange 
rate stability. The consequence of that reversal is also a precise analysis of inflation 
curbing since it was centered on the subsequent rise of interest rates, money slowdown 
and price curbing.” (Fratianni and Spinelli (2001), p. 689) 
 
Hence, Governor Fazio’s action would be the result of a deep cultural change 
leading to the giving-up of a theoretical scheme based on the idea that inflation is not 
significantly influenced by the monetary policy, and the stability of prices is to be 
                                                                   
6  Fratianni e Spinelli (2001), pp.676-677.  In 1991, Fratianni and Spinelli had expressed a quite 
different opinion on Ciampi, who they believed had the merit of having enforced the strategy 
developed by his predecessor Paolo Baffi. 
7 Fratianni and Spinelli (2001), p. 516.  
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achieved through the control of production costs and the stabilization of foreign 
exchange rates. Governor Fazio is to be given credit for avoiding the errors made b y 
his predecessor. As a matter of fact, Fazio’s courageous decisions produced the 
important results attained during the course of the ‘90s.8 
 
 
2) The Limits of the Monetarist Intepretation 
The monetarist interpretation is based on the existence of a close  relationship 
between money and prices as envisaged by the quantitative theory of money. The 
high inflation of the ‘70s is explained by the excessive creation of money due to  
“fiscal dominance”. In the ‘80s, the monetary authorities aimed at reducing inflation; 
however, they enforced a wrong policy based on foreign exchange rate stabilization 
rather than on the control of money quantity. This explains the unsatisfactory results 
recorded in those years. In the ‘90s, a correct policy based on the control of m oney 
quantity made it possible to offset the difference between inflation in Italy, on the one 
side, and in the other more virtuous European countries, on the other.  
I intend to prove that this interpretation is not correct since in the period under 
consideration the conditions required to ensure the validity of the  quantitative theory 
of money did not exist in Italy. The causal relationship between money and prices has 
to be based on three conditions: the first assumption should be that the money supply 
is independent from demand and, therefore, disequilibria on the money market might 
occur due to exogenous variations in supply. The second assumption should be that 
disequilibria between money demand and supply originate significant changes in the 
aggregated demand. The third assumption is that these changes in the aggregated 
demand cause only variations in the level of prices since in the long run real income 
is independent from money quantity. 
The first two assumptions the quantitative theory is based on  did not match the 
actual conditions observed in Italy in the period under consideration. I intend to show 
that the changes in the money quantity recorded during the period being the object of 
this analysis were caused by changes in demand rather than in supply; therefore, the 
quantity of money should be considered endogenous rather than exogenous. I will 
also explain the reasons why significant changes in the aggregated demand cannot be 
associated to the observed variations in the money quantity. I  discuss these points in 
the following three paragraphs: in the first one, I consider the endogenous character 
of money supply; in the second, I analyze the relationship between money quantity 
and aggregated demand; in the third, I present some data as evidence for the criticism 
against the monetarist interpretation of the Italian experience. 
2.a) The Endogenous Character of Money Quantity 
                                                                   
8 Fratianni and Spinelli (2001), p. 699.  
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The monetarist interpretation  underlines the  discontinuity of the manoeuvre 
relating to the money quantity in the ‘80s and ‘90s. Only in the ‘90s, the authorities 
seemed to succeed in effectively controlling the money quantity, thus achieving 
important results in terms of inflation reduction. This reconstruction of the Italian 
experience does not seem correct. The monetary policy pursued in the ‘80s and ‘90s 
was characterized by an element of continuity consisting in the interest rate 
manoeuvre. In these years, the anti-inflationary action was based on the interest rate 
manoeuvre. Neither in the ‘80s nor in the ‘90s the monetary  authorities aimed at 
controlling the money quantity. It is indeed true that during the course of the ‘90s the 
monetary authorities took the monetary aggregates into greater consideration than in 
the past,9 and announced a planned value of the growth rate o f the money quantity. 
However, at the same time, they did not comply with the planned monetary values. 
The monetary authorities conducted their anti-inflationary action by manoeuvring 
interest rates, and accepted significant differences of the money quantity growth rate 
as compared with the planned values  – these differences being caused by money 
demand reaction to the changes in interest rates. 
In the early ‘90s, the monetary authorities set a range of values relating to the 
growth rate of the money quantity. This range was 5 -8 percent for 1991 and 5 -7 per 
cent for the subsequent years until 1994. In 1993, the monetary authorities accepted a 
money-quantity growth rate above the set ceiling. This difference was due to a 
change in the portfolio structure following some changes in yield rates.
10 In the 
second half of 1994, the monetary authorities started implementing a restrictive 
manoeuvre aimed at challenging the signs of inflation deterioration. Bank of Italy 
remarked that, during the course of the ‘90s, a n ew important element  – this being 
inflation expectations  – had entered the mechanism of transmission connecting 
monetary instruments to the inflation target. The importance of this new element is 
justified by the process of liberalization of capital movements and by the foreign 
exchange rate flexibility.
11 In such a context, a vicious circle might develop; this 
would be based on the following sequence: deterioration of inflation expectations  - 
devaluation of the foreign exchange rate  - increased prices of imported goods  - 
increased inflation rate  - deterioration of inflation expectations.
12 In order to avoid 
such a vicious circle, monetary authorities have to take prompt action, and increase 
interest rates when in the presence of the first signs of deteriorating expectations, 
without waiting for any increase in prices. In the second half of 1994, monetary 
authorities behaved in this way, and raised interest rates in order to respond to a 
devaluation of the exchange rate which was an indication of deteriorating  inflation 
expectations, although the inflation rate had not risen.
13 The 0.5 percent increase in 
                                                                   
9 See for example the Bank of Italy 1993 Yearly Report (BIYR 1993), p. 163; BIYR 1994, p. 173.  
10 “In 1993, the M2 variation... was 7.9 percent. A growth slightly exceeding the planned ceiling... is to 
be ascribed not only to the marked fall in the yield of Treasury bonds (short term securities), but also 
to the supply policies of intermediaries and to the back-flow of capital from abroad.” (BIYR 1993, p. 
168). 
11 BIYR 1994, p. 177; BIYR 1995, p. 168. 
12 BIYR 1995, p. 170. 
13 BIYR 1994, p. 177.  
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the official discount rate in August 1994 was followed by two further rises in 1995 
for a total of 1.5 percentage points. The manoeuvre continued until mid 1996. In the 
presence of a concurrent increase in interest rates, a significant reduction in the 
money quantity growth rate was recorded. In the 1994-1996 period, the growth rate 
of the money quantity was permanently below planned values. The central bank had 
set an interval between 5 and 7 percent for 1994, while for the two subsequent years a 
planned value of 5 percent had been indicated. In all years, the M2 growth rate was 
significantly lower: 3.1 percent in 1994, 1.9 per cent in 1994 and 2.6 percent in 1995. 
These figures  – being far below planned values - did not lead the monetary authorities 
to consider that they had implemented an excessively restrictive manoeuvre. The 
central bank did not adopt measures so as to comply with the planned value of the 
money growth rate. The monetary authorities actually considered the reduction of the 
money-quantity growth rate as a consequence of the change in the money demand 
due to the increasing opportunity money cost resulting from the greater difference 
between the yield of assets alternative to money and the yield of bank deposits. The 
1994 report outlines: 
“The last year’s slowdown (of the M2 growth rate) matched the marked rise of the 
rates of interest on savings  instruments alternative to bank deposits, and was affected by the 
greater caution of intermediaries in setting the rates on deposits: in the May-December 
period, the average yield of Treasury bonds rose by almost two percentage points while that 
of bank deposits declined by 0.4 per cent.” (BIYR 1994, p. 173) 
 
The same arguments are used to explain the 1995 figures.
14 It can, thus, be 
concluded that the monetary authorities did not correct the value of the money growth 
rate with reference to the planned value because those figures were consistent with 
the objective of inflation control. This objective was pursued by influencing inflation 
expectations by acting on interest rates. 
 In short, the first assumption the quantitative theory of money is based on did 
not prove true. The disequilibria between money demand and supply, which cause 
inflation according to the quantitative theory, cannot appear when the monetary 
authorities control interest rates as in the case of Italy in the ‘80s and ‘90s. In this 
case, the changes in the money quantity are the consequence of changes in the money 
demand - i.e. of modifications of portfolio choices. 
The behavior of the Italian monetary authorities is not an exception in respect of 
other industrialized countries. The decision made in many countries to follow an 
inflation targeting strategy is justified by the high instability of the relationship 
between money quantity and the targets of the monetary authorities.
15 Romer (2000) 
remarks that the strategy of the central banks of the most important countries is based 
on the manoeuvre of interest rates, and is not aimed at pursuing a specific target in 
terms of money quantity. The Bank of England  - that Fratianni and Spinelli mention 
as a model  - follows a strategy which does not envisage the control of monetary 
                                                                   
14 BIYR 1995, p. 173. 
15 See for example Leidermann and Svensson (1995); Mishkin (1999).  
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aggregates.
16  Another i nteresting example is provided by the choices of the European 
Central Bank. Meltzer (2001) considers the ECB’s decision to assign a central role to 
money quantity as a positive example when compared with the Federal Reserve’s 
decision to ignore money quantity. In this connection, it may be interesting to note, in 
the first place, that money quantity is not an intermediate target for the ECB, which 
while announcing the money quantity growth rate that it considers consistent with the 
objective value of the inflation rate, does not feel bound to comply with this value.
17 
In the second place, it has to be underlined that the announcement of the money 
quantity growth rate is the first of the two pillars on which ECB anti-inflationary 
strategy is based on. The second pillar is the monitoring of a wide range of economic 
and financial indicators including wages, foreign exchange rates, prices of securities, 
various measures of the real economic activity, fiscal policy indicators, and price and 
cost indices. According  to the ECB, these two pillars provide two different 
explanations of inflation: 
 
“The first pillar represents approaches which attribute a prime value to money in 
explaining the future evolution of prices... The second pillar includes a series of 
alternative models of the inflationary process, mainly those emphasizing the  interaction 
between supply and demand and/or the pressures related to costs.”( ECB, 2001, p. 42)  
 
The use of these two pillars mirrors the decision not to follow a single theoretical 
line as well as the awareness that an anti-inflationary strategy exclusively based on 
the control of the money quantity has indeed some limits.
18  
2.b) Money Quantity and Aggregated Demand 
According to the quantitative theory, the presence of a disequilibrium b etween 
money demand and supply due to a sudden change in supply, causes a change in the 
aggregated demand. Friedman illustrates this relationship in various ways. The first 
case is the famous example whereby the new money is launched from a helicopter. 
Friedman (1969) considers a balanced system in the frame of which operators express 
a given money demand in real terms. For example, if demand is equal to one tenth of 
the income, against a 10,000 dollar income the money demand will be 1,000 dollars. 
With reference to such a situation, Friedman assumes that a helicopter drops 1,000 
new dollars from the sky. All operators collect the new money. If people just keep the 
new money, income and prices would remain unchanged. However, Friedman 
                                                                   
16 Bank of England 1999, p. 9. 
17 ECB 1999, 2000. 
18 “It is not advisable to exclusively rely on the first pillar for the analysis underlying monetary policy 
decisions on the basis of the following two arguments. First, due to the variable speed of money 
circulation it may be sometimes difficult to interpret short term monetary patterns and to identify the 
signs of risks relating to price stability... Second, to exclusively rely on the first pillar involves the risk 
to pay insufficient attention to medium-term price stability risks resulting from the pattern of variables 
other than money.” (ECB 2001, p. 47).  
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remarks that it is not  logical to think that individuals simply increase their money 
reserves. If all individuals deemed it appropriate to hold a money quantity equal to 
one tenth of their income, there is no reason to think that, after the launching of the 
money from the helicopter, they modify their behavior, and decide to accumulate a 
money reserve equal to one fifth of their income. As a result, any change in the 
money supply will lead operators to reduce their money reserves by demanding 
goods. This leads to a consequent rise in prices. Symmetrical effects derive from a  
sudden reduction in the money quantity. In this case, Friedman assumes that the 
public sector burns the money collected with a new tax in an incinerator. In both 
cases, the change in the money supply is combined with a change in the aggregated 
demand. In the case of the helicopter, individuals ask for a greater quantity of goods 
because their nominal and real wealth increases; in the case of the incinerator, the cut 
of the money supply leads to a reduction in the spending capacity of individuals. 
The second explanation by which Friedman describes the consequences of the 
changes in the money supply is based on the distinction between money market and 
credit market. He asserts that the money market operates as any other market 
characterized by a demand function, a supply function and a price. The critical point 
is the correct definition of the money price. Friedman remarks that a 
misunderstanding often arises as to ‘money’ and ‘credit’. This leads to a non correct 
definition of the money price. Friedman says that the money price is the quantity of 
goods that can be purchased with a money unit and, consequently, corresponds to the 
reciprocal value of the price level; instead the interest rate corresponds to the credit 
price. A disequilibrium between money demand and supply will, therefore, cause a 
change in the level of prices; a disequilibrium between credit demand and supply will 
instead lead to a change in the interest rate.19 The different impact of changes in 
money quantity and credit on prices is explained by considering the different effects 
that they produce on the aggregated demand. In the case of the money market, it is 
assumed that the spending capacity of individuals varies as the money quantity 
changes. On the other hand, in the case of the credit market, an increase in the credit 
supply does not involve any change in the aggregated demand since the greater 
demand for goods by credit beneficiaries is offset by the lower demand by credit 
suppliers. 
The analysis of the Italian experience in the ‘80s and ‘90s seems not to provide 
elements confirming the relationship between money quantity variation and level of 
the aggregated demand as described by monetarists. As previously stated, in those 
years, the monetary authorities controlled interest rates; then, the changes in the 
money quantity reflected the conditions of demand. The conditions do not exist to 
associate the observed changes in the money quantity to the modifications of the 
aggregated demand assumed by Friedman in the example of the helicopter or when 
he describes the difference between credit and money markets. Fratianni and Spinelli 
attribute significant anti-inflationary effects to the reduction in the money quantity 
growth rate recorded in the period 1994-1996. It is actually difficult to imagine that 
these changes in the money quantity  - which mirror the impact of decisions relating to 
                                                                   
19 Friedman and Schwartz (1982), p. 26.  
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wealth composition  - may have had effects similar to those described by Friedman 
when using the example of the incinerator. 
It seems equally unrealistic to believe that the high interest rate policy pursued by 
the monetary authorities during those years led to a reduction in stock prices and, 
therefore, in the market value of households’ wealth to an extent susceptible of 
generating a significant decline of the aggregated demand and, hence, of the inflation 
rate. A superficial analysis of the composition of households’ financial wealth 
highlights the total absence of this phenomenon. On the contrary, between 1995 and 
1999, a marked increase was recorded in the share of stocks in the total financial 
wealth: from 18.5 percent in 1995 to 45.6 percent in 1999.
20 This evolution reflects 
the marked rise of stock exchange quotations. The Italian experience shows not only 
that the increase in interest rates between 1994 and 1996 did not trigger a negative 
wealth effect, but also that the substantial positive wealth effect stemming from the 
upsurge of stock prices did not hinder the process of inflation curbing. 
 
2.c) Some Figures 
In this paragraph, some data consistent with the considerations expressed in the 
previous pages are provided. Figure 1) shows the variation rates of the money 
quantity and inflation rates. At first glance, these figures seem to confirm the validity 
of the  monetarist interpretation. In the ‘70s, the increasing inflation rate and high 
growth rates of the money quantity were concurrent; in the ‘80s and ‘90s, the curbing 
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20 BIYR 2000, p. 214.  
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Figure 1)  
Inflation rate  (--- ) and variation rate of the quantity of money M2 (- - -) 
(source: Bank of Italy)  
 
This empirical evidence is similar to what is generally used to prove the validity 
of the monetarist theory. These are verifications considering the long-term correlation 
between the money growth rate and the inflation rate by using data relating to a large 
number of countries. For example, McCandless and Weber (1995) utilize the average 
growth rates of the money quantity and the inflation rate in a 30-year period (1960-
1990) relating to 110 countries. Dwyer and Hafer (1988) utilize the average data 
relating to a five-year period (1979-1984) concerning 62 countries. In both cases, 
results consistent with the conclusions of the money quantitative theory are obtained. 
The data included in Figure 1) also show a significant correlation between the money 
quantity and the inflation rate: in the ‘70s, the 19.5 percent average growth rate of the 
money quantity matched a 13.6 percent average inflation rate; in the ‘80s, the money 
average growth rate dropped to 11.4 percent and the average inflation rate to 9.1 
percent. Finally, in the ‘90s, the money average growth rate reached 4 percent and 
average inflation rate fell to 2.2 percent. The possibility to use the data of Figure 1) as 
a confirmation of the validity of the quantitative theory is questioned for two reasons. 
In the first place, there is no evidence permitting to consider the changes in the 
money quantity as exogenous in respect of  price changes. According to the 
quantitative theory, changes in the money quantity have to mirror the disequilibria 
between demand and supply caused by sudden variations of supply. In the previous 
pages, it was underlined that during the course of the ‘80s and ‘90s monetary 
authorities controlled interest rates without establishing a target in terms of money 
quantity  - which has to be considered as an endogenous factor. In the second place, it 
has to be pointed out that the data in Figure 1) suggest that the ‘80s and ‘90s are to be 
considered as a homogeneous period characterized by a reduction of the money 
quantity growth rate and by the curbing of the inflation rate. However, this 
interpretation does not explain the reasons behind the currency crisis in 1992. If in the 
‘80s the monetary policy was correctly implemented by lowering the growth rate of 
the money quantity, what are the reasons for the 1992 devaluation? As previously 
mentioned, Fratianni and Spinelli believe that the basic reason for the currency crisis 
lies in the limits of the anti-inflationary policy pursued in the ‘80s. In that period, the 
Italian monetary authorities seem not to have applied a sufficiently rigorous 
manoeuvre. In the ‘80s, the money quantity grew at a faster pace than in the  ‘90s 
when it would have permitted to eliminate the inflation differential in respect to more 
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Figure 2) Households’ financial assets/GDP  (source: Bank of Italy) 
 
Fratianni and Spinelli’s interpretation is based on the idea that the rate of variation 
of the money quantity is an indicator that sufficiently represents the lines pursued by 
the monetary policy. This point of view is not convincing. The money quantity 
measured by the financial accounts corresponds  to the money held by system 
operators. Hence, when measuring the money quantity, money is considered as a 
component of the operators’ wealth. This implies that even admitting that  monetary 
authorities control money supply, the strength of the monetary manoeuvre cannot be 
assessed by exclusively considering the rate of variation of the money quantity. It is 
necessary to also take the size and variation of wealth into consideration.
21 The rate 
of variation of the money quantity being equal, the manoeuvre of t he monetary 
authorities will be the more restrictive the greater the rate of variation of financial 
wealth is.  Consequently, when admitting that monetary authorities control the money 
quantity, the most significant data to assess the strength of a monetary manoeuvre 
should be the relationship between the money stock and operators’ financial wealth. 
Figure 2) presents the pattern of households’ financial wealth in relation to GDP. This 
ratio was substantially constant in the ‘70s, and markedly increased in  the’80s. In 
1983, households’ financial wealth was 0.88-fold GDP, and 1.8-fold in 1993; in the 
following years, this ratio declined, and grew again in 1997 and 1998 when it reached 
                                                                   
21 Friedman (1956) emphasizes that the quantitative theory is a money demand theory, and that the 
analysis of money demand may be conducted as the consumer goods demand theory is developed. As 
to money demand, budget constraint is wealth rather than income.  
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the value of 2.18. In the ‘80s, the households’ financial wealth grew much faster than 
in the ‘90s. This is confirmed by the figures relating to the households’ financial net 
flows shown in Figure 3). In the ‘80s, the households financial net flows/GDP ratio 
swung between 12 and 14 percent. In the ‘90s, a dramatic drop in the value of this 
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Figure 3) Households’ financial net flows/GDP  (source: Bank of Italy) 
 
In short, as compared with the ‘90s, the ‘80s were characterized by higher rates of 
variation of the money quantity as well as by a higher growth of households’ 
financial wealth. Figure 4) shows the breakdown of households’ financial wealth. The 
continuous line indicates the share of money; the dotted line represents the share of 
securities, stocks and mutual fund shares.  
In the ‘70s, a significantly increased share of money was recorded; in the ‘80s, 
this share sharply dropped to 68 percent in 1979 and to 35.4 percent in 1992. This is 
evidence of the fact that in the ‘80s the households’ financial wealth grew at a faster 
pace than money. In the ‘90s, the downtrend of the money share continued, although 
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Figure 4) Breakdown of households financial wealth (source: Bank of Italy) 
These data  confirm that even assuming that the changes in money quantity were 
caused by monetary authorities, it is impossible to assert that the restrictive 
manoeuvre implemented in the ‘90s was stricter than in the ‘80s. This conclusion is 
consistent with other two observations: the first relates to the fact that in the ‘90s the 
drop in the money share was particularly sharp in the years 1997-1998; the monetary 
squeeze took place in the 1994-1996 period. The second observation relates to the 
pattern of real interest rates; on average, real interest rates were higher in the ‘80s 
than in the ‘90s. In the 1981-1992 period, a 5.7-percent average annual value of the 
real  ex post rate on Treasury bonds was recorded; in the ‘90s, the average value was 
4.8 percent. Whereas i t is not possible to prove that in the ‘90s the anti-inflationary 
policy was more rigorous than in the ‘80s, it is equally not possible - contrary to what 
Fratianni and Spinelli assert  - to ascribe the 1992 currency crisis to an insufficiently 
rigorous monetary policy, on the one side, and the curbing of inflation in the ‘90s to 
the correct policy pursued by monetary authorities, on the other. Consequently, two 
paramount problems are still unsolved: in the first place, the causes of the 1992 crisis 
remain t o be explained. In the second place, it is necessary to work out an explanation 








PART II: AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION 
 
The evolution of Italian inflation can be  more convincingly explained not so 
much in relation to the monetarist theory, but rather on the basis of a theory on 
inflation emphasizing the role of the pattern of production costs and of the behavior 
of enterprises in relation to mark-up definition. This theory is based on three points: 
a) the stages of inflation expansion cannot be explained only by the accommodating 
attitude of monetary authorities; b) the monetary policy affects the inflation rate since 
it has an impact on factors influencing production costs ( e.g., foreign exchange rate 
and the level of aggregated demand); c) a manoeuvre aimed at curbing inflation 
cannot be exclusively based on the monetary policy, but must also envisage recourse 
to other instruments such as income and tax policies. 
In Italy, monetary authorities strongly favored this theory. In the period under 
consideration, all four Governors of Bank of Italy  - Guido Carli (1960-1975), Paolo 
Baffi (1975-1979), Carlo A. Ciampi (1979-1993) and the current Governor Antonio 
Fazio  - agreed on this explanation of inflation.  The Italian Central Bank underlines 
that inflation in the ‘70s cannot be simply explained by the accommodating attitude 
of monetary authorities, but it is basically to be ascribed to the growth of labor cost 
and to increased public expenditure.
22 
In order to highlight the impact of labor claims on the pattern of labor cost, Carli 
(1977, p. 58) stated that in the ‘70s Italy had a labor standard system,  i.e. “a system 
characterized by wage as an independent variable”. Under these conditions, inflation 
was the necessary cost to be borne in order to maintain high growth rates.
23 Baffi 
(BIYR 1978, pp. 377-8) highlighted the non monetary causes of inflation. On the 
basis of this analysis of the causes of inflation, the Governors of Bank of Italy 
reached the conclusion that a policy aimed at achieving the stability of prices cannot 
be based only on the recourse to monetary instruments, but it should also utilize other 
instruments such as the tax and income policies. Baffi (BIYR  1975, p. 441)  pointed 
out the costs of an anti-inflationary manoeuvre exclusively based on the monetary 
policy. In the 1980 yearly report,  Ciampi wished a new monetary constitution based 
on the coordinated adoption of monetary, fiscal and income policy m easures. In the 
‘90s, Ciampi’s successor, A. Fazio, followed the same line: 
“In a large and complex economic system the level of prices is strongly affected by 
other variables and circumstances, first of all fiscal policy and labor costs. In such cases 
the reliance solely on monetary policy to achieve monetary stability can be extremely 
costly in terms of other economic objectives.” (Fazio (1991), p. 135) 
 
The supporters of the new classic macroeconomics assert that this statements are 
the expression of an  obsolete theoretical approach considering the behavior of 
enterprises, trade unions and public sector independent from the monetary 
authorities’ decisions. According to this approach, the decisions of enterprises, trade 
                                                                   
22For a deeper analysis of the arguments of the Italian monetary authorities in those years see: 
Bertocco (1991, 1992); Visco (1995).  
23 BIYR 1972, p. 410.  
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unions and public sector are conditioned by the strength of the anti-inflationary 
commitment of the central bank. The conclusion is, thus, reiterated whereby inflation 
is basically a monetary phenomenon substantially due to the measures adopted by the 
monetary authorities which are in a position to influence the behavior of the other 
economic subjects. A significant example of this approach is provided by Cukierman 
(1992), who considers the above statement by Fazio as the expression of an obsolete 
theoretical scheme since it ignores the impact of the measures adopted by the 
monetary authorities on the behavior of economic operators.
24 Cukierman underlines 
that the pattern of wages and the public sector’s decisions are conditioned by the 
decisions made by the monetary authorities.
25 In the presence of a strict control of the 
growth rate of the quantity of money, the public sector is not in a position to 
independently set its deficit as it would face increasing difficulties in financing its 
expenditure.
26  
I intend to demonstrate that the theory whereby inflation is due to costs makes it 
possible to work out a significant explanation of the causes of the currency crisis in 
September 1992 and of the curbing of inflation in the ‘90s. On the basis of this 
theoretical scheme, the ‘80s and the ‘90s can be subdivided into two sub-periods 
separated by the 1992 currency crisis. The two periods are differentiated in relation to 
the characteristic of the anti inflationary manoeuvre: in the ‘80s, this manoeuvre was 
solely based on the monetary policy; in the ‘90s, after the devaluation, the anti-
inflationary action was characterized by the concurrent adoption of monetary, fiscal 
and income policy measures. 
The changes in the characteristics of the anti-inflationary manoeuvre can explain 
the 1992 currency crisis a nd the curbing of inflation in the ‘90s. The devaluation is to 
be basically ascribed to the disequilibria caused by an anti-inflationary policy 
exclusively based on monetary measures. On the other hand, the curbing of inflation 
in the ‘90s, notwithstanding the heavy devaluation of the lira, may be explained by 
the effectiveness of a manoeuvre based on the adoption of combined monetary, fiscal 
and income policy measures. The fact that these measures were not adopted before 
the 1992 crisis contradicts the arguments put forward by Cukierman and the 
supporters of the new classic macroeconomics whereby the choices of workers and of 
the public sector are conditioned by the decisions made by the monetary authorities. 
Starting from 1979, concurrently with the adhesion to the European Monetary 
System, the monetary authorities manoeuvred interest rates with a view of stabilizing 
the foreign exchange rate in relation to the other European currencies. The 
stabilization policy became the only element of the anti-inflationary manoeuvre. 
According to Cukierman, the strong commitment of the monetary authorities should 
                                                                   
24 Cukierman criticizes Fazio, and asserts that: “This statement is obviously true and realistic. But it 
ignores the effect of what the public and the political authorities know about the accommodative 
tendencies of the central bank on the behavior of wages, prices, and the fiscal deficit.” Cukierman 
1992, p. 15. 
25 “.... The extent of wage push is itself endogenous. In particular, it reflects what individuals know 
about the central bank’s tendency to accommodate prices, labor costs, and budgetary deficits." 
Cukierman 1992, p. 15 
26See: McCallum 1999.  
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have had a significant impact on the behavior of workers and of the public sector. 
This did not happen. On the contrary, the absence of significant income and f iscal 
policy measures compelled the monetary authority to raise interest rates to 
particularly high levels. This led to the disequilibria that are the basic cause of the 
devaluation of the lira in September 1992. Paradoxically, in coincidence with the 
devaluation, which marked the failure of the anti-inflationary policy based on the 
stabilization of the foreign exchange rate of the currency, the conditions were laid for 
the adoption of the income and fiscal policy measures which made it possible to 
reduce i nflation notwithstanding the devaluation of the lira. The following two 
paragraphs review the most significant aspects of the two stages of the process of 
curbing of inflation in the ‘80s and in the ‘90s. 
 
3.a) The 1980-1992 Period 
Following the adhesion o f Italy to the European Monetary System in 1979, the 
stabilization of the foreign exchange rate became the hinge of the anti-inflationary 
manoeuvre. The stable foreign exchange rate was  an element of discipline for 
enterprises which could no longer rely o n devaluation, and had to protect their 
competitiveness through the control of costs.
27 The monetary authorities protected the 
foreign exchange rate by using interest rates. The manoeuvre centered on interest 
rates was possible following the creation  - in t he mid ‘70s  - of a monetary market, 
which enabled the central bank to control interest rates in a period characterized by 
high inflation rates. Such a policy made it possible to significantly reduce the annual 
rate of variation of consumer prices. This rate dropped from 21 percent in 1980 to 6 
percent in 1987, with a corresponding cut of the inflation differential with Germany, 
from 16 to 4.5 percentage points. At first glance, this policy appears to be consistent 
with the indications of the most recent developments of the monetary theory whereby 
the monetary authorities should pursue the objective of price stability by defining a 
nominal pegging. A significant example of nominal pegging is the setting of a foreign 
exchange rate in relation to currency of a  country with a low inflation rate. This 
manoeuvre should push inflation expectations of the country to the level of those in 
the countries with a low inflation rate.28 This manoeuvre is actually not fully effective 
as shown by the fact that rigorous behaviors of monetary authorities did not influence 
the behavior of enterprises, of workers and of the public sector contrary to what the 
new classic macro-economy envisages. Only after the devaluation in 1992, which 
marked the end of the foreign stabilization policy, significant income and budget 
policy measures were adopted. In the ‘80s, the monetary authorities repeatedly 
pointed out that the high level of interest rates was due to the impact of the foreign 
                                                                   
27  See: Ciampi (1988); Gressani, Guiso, Visco (1987); Visco (1995); Pittaluga, Verga (1995); Bertocco 
(1997); Gaiotti, Gavosto, Grande (1998). 
28 The limit of this strategy is that the country stabilizing the foreign exchange rate should give up 
using monetary policy independently in order to face domestic problems. See Mishkin (1999).  
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exchange protection policy on the monetary policy.
29  
This anti-inflationary action led to heavy disequilibria in foreign and public 
accounts. These disequilibria are the ultimate cause of the devaluation of the lira in 
September 1992. The equilibrium of the balance of payments obtained by offsetting 
the deficit of current items with a surplus of capital movements was quite fragile 
since it was based on the availability of international financial markets to subscribe 
credit instruments of national operators. In the early ‘90s, increased interest rates in 
Germany following the unification process, compelled the Italian monetary 
authorities to raise interest rates to so high levels that doubts about the capacity of the 
Italian economic system to bear the effects of such measures were justified. The high 
interest r ate policy also had a significant impact on public accounts. In the ‘80s, a 
marked increase in the expenditure for interests was recorded with a consequent rise 
of public deficit and debt.
30 
The fragile equilibrium characterizing the ‘80s became most evident at the end of 
1991 when the Maastricht Treaty was undersigned. This Treaty established the 
parameters required to measure the degree of convergence of the countries that had to 
participate in the European Monetary Union. The definition of these criteria 
immediately highlighted Italy’s non compliance with the conditions that the 
Maastrich Treaty considered consistent with the participation in the EMU. The only 
parameter Italy was complying with was the foreign exchange rate. The levels of 
inflation rate, i nterest rate, public deficit and public debt were quite far away from the 
values established by the Treaty. Expectations of devaluation of the lira spread, and 
could not be opposed to by the defense measures adopted only by the Italian 
monetary authorities. This led to the devaluation of the lira and to the exit from the 
EMS. In short, the devaluation may be considered as the expression of an insufficient 
anti-inflationary action solely based on monetary policy.
31  
Another important aspect of the experience  of the ‘80s concerns the 
characteristics of the mechanism of transmission of the monetary policy. The 
stabilization of the foreign exchange rate did not significantly influence inflation 
expectations, but it produced its anti-inflationary impact by acting  on production 
costs. A stable exchange rate helps to reduce inflation in two ways: a) by reducing 
imported inflation, b) by introducing an element of discipline for enterprises which 
can no longer count on currency devaluation and have to pursue their objectives in 
terms of competitiveness by reducing their profit margins and production costs. This 
explanation is frequently found in the papers of the Bank of Italy. Governor Ciamp 
(BIYR, 1986, conluding remarks, pp. 14-15), emphasized the fact that inflation 
reduction was favored by the reorganization process by which enterprises reacted to 
the discipline imposed by the exchange rate, on the one side, and to the high interest 
rate policy, on the other. This restructuring process would most likely have not been 
implemented in the absence of a weakened position of the trade unions following the 
                                                                   
29 RABdI (1985), final considerations (FC), p. 18; RABdI (1986), FC, p. 27, RABdI (1992), FC, p. 28, 
RABdI (1993), FC, pp. 10-11.  
30 This pattern of interest rates and of public deficit helps to explain the high growth of households’ 
financial wealth in the ‘80s. 
31 See for example: Ciccarone and Gnesutta (1993); Sarcinelli (1995); Visco (1995).  
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unsuccessful outcome of the dispute with Fiat, the major Italian private industry (fall 
1980). The Research Department of Bank of Italy published several empirical works 
highlighting the impact of the foreign exchange rate on the various components of the 
price index. Significant results were obtained by the analysis performed by Gressani, 
Guiso and Visco through simulation exercises based on the econometric model of 
Bank  of Italy. These exercises show that if the monetary authorities had implemented 
- between 1979 and 1986  - an accommodating foreign exchange policy  -  i.e., if they 
had permitted a full adjustment of the nominal exchange rate to the differential 
between the  pattern of domestic and foreign prices  - on average, inflation would have 
been about 4 percentage points higher than the historical values.
32 
 
3.b) The ‘90s 
In coincidence with and immediately after the devaluation, important measures of 
income and budget p olicy were adopted. This coincidence was not accidental. The 
devaluation  - which occurred less than one year after the Maastricht Treaty and in the 
middle of a social crisis related to the discovery of widespread phenomena of 
corruption of the political class  - was a traumatic event. The public opinion suddenly 
realized the difference existing between Italy and the other European countries. In 
this situation, heavy measures aimed at bringing public accounts back to equilibrium 
and effective income policy measures were adopted.
33 
In September 1992, the Amato government  – taking advantage of the currency 
crisis  - succeeded in adopting a 92,000 billion lire manoeuvre aimed at bringing 
public accounts to equilibrium. In subsequent years, similar manoeuvres made i t 
possible to progressively reduce the public deficit/GDP ratio from over 10 percent in 
1991 to below 3 percent as required by the Maastricht Treaty. In July 1993, an 
agreement containing income policy measures was reached by the government with 
the social parties. This agreement completed the one signed in July 1992, which had 
eliminated the wage indexation system based on the so-called “scala mobile” (cost-
of-living adjustment). More specifically, the agreement linked the biennial increase in 
minimum wages to the inflation rate established as a target by the government. At the 
end of two-year period, if the actual inflation were to exceed the planned level, the 
social parties were to be called to negotiate the recovery.34 
The combination of these events deeply changed the Italian economy. The 
intensity and the speed of this change may be perceived by comparing the estimates 
                                                                   
32 Gressani, Guiso and Visco (1987), p. 154. See also: Nicoletti Altimari, Rinaldi, Siviero and 
Terlizzese (1997); Siviero and Terlizzese (1997). 
33 See as an example: Arcelli and Micossi (1997); Salvati (2000). 
34  Rossi (1998, p.109) underlines the effects of these measures, and points out: “In the 1991-1995 
period per capita wages decreased by 3.3 percent in the economy as a whole. Wages remained 
unchanged in industry where productivity grew by almost 8 percent. In nominal terms, the overall 
labor cost per product unit increased by only slightly above 2 percent in industry in four years. Twenty 
years before, in the 1972-1976 period characterized by a dramatic weakening of the lira foreign 
exchange rate, the same variable grew by 94 percent." See also Onofri (2001).  
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of the impact of a possible devaluation of the lira worked out by the Bank of Italy in 
August 1992, with the historical values. By using its own econometric model, the 
central bank estimated at about 40 percent the short-term elasticity of prices at the 
current exchange rate, with an increase up to 70 percent in the medium run. 
Furthermore, the devaluation was expected to bring a greater c ompetitiveness with 
expansion repercussions on investments and income.35  However, reality was quite 
different: 
 
“In the two years following the crisis, the devaluation was far higher than 
expectations, and reached 30 percent. Far from increasing, inflation declined by almost 
1.5 percentage points. Investments in machinery collapsed by almost 20 percent in 1993; 
the average 1994 value was still about 16 percentage points below the level reached in 
1991. Still in 1993, for the first time since 1970 consumption had declined by 2.5 percent 
and GDP fell by more than 1 percent.” (Siviero and Terlizzese, (1995), pp. 842-3) 
 
 
This decline of domestic demand  – notwithstanding export expansion thrusts  
engendered by devaluation  - mirrors a significant change in consumption and 
investment decisions. The devaluation, the crisis of financial markets, the heavy fiscal 
manoeuvre,  increased households’ uncertainty about their prospects of income, with 
a consequent depression of consumption. This uncertainty spread through e nterprises, 
and also affected the demand for investment goods.
36 
These measures of fiscal policy contributed to restraining inflation in two ways: 
in the first place, it is reasonable to assume that the impact of these measures on the 
level of aggregated demand induced enterprises to modify their mark-up-related 
decisions.
37 In the second place, measures of fiscal policy influenced inflationary 
expectations. In Part I of this paper, the fact was pointed out that during the ‘90s, 
after the currency crisis, the role of expectations in the process aimed at defining 
inflation became particularly significant. Leiderman and Svensson (1995) stated that 
decisions relating to the size of the public deficit may have an impact on expectations 
greater than that of the announcements relating to growth rates of monetary 
aggregates.
38 
The pattern of inflation seems to have been considerably influenced also by the 
measures of income policy adopted following 1992 and 1993 agreements.  The anti-
inflationary impact of these measures was defined through some simulations made by 
the Research Department of Bank of Italy.39 The first simulation shows that in the 
absence of an income policy, inflation would have been 2 -3 percentage points higher 
in 1966 and 3 -5 percentage points in 1997.
40 The second simulation was aimed at 
defining the interest rate variation required to cut inflation to the level observed in 
                                                                   
35 Siviero and Terlizzese (1995). 
36 Locarno and Rossi (1995); Visco (1995); Onofri (2000). 
37 Bank of Italy’s econometric model assumes that the mark-up varies also in relation to the degree of 
utilization of production capacity. See Siviero and Terlizzese (1997). 
38 See also: Visco (1995); Onofri (2000). 
39 Fabiani, Locarno, Oneto and Sestito (1998). 
40 Fabiani, Locarno, Oneto and Sestito (1998), p. 45.  
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reality in the absence of an income policy. The simulation shows that monetary 
authorities should have considerably increased interest rates, which would have led to 
a public deficit far above 3 percent and to a public debt/GDP ratio 15 percentage 
points above the historical value at the end of 1997. According to the authors of the 
simulation such a manoeuvre not only would have prevented Italy to enter EMU, but 
probably would not have even succeeded in cutting inflation since the deterioration of 
public accounts would have undermined the credibility  of  the anti-inflationary  
action of  monetary authorities.
41 The third element of the anti-inflationary 
manoeuvre is the monetary policy. In Part I, the characteristics of the restrictive 
manoeuvre performed in the 1994-1996 period were described; the peculiarities of 
this manoeuvre as compared with those of the ‘70s and ‘80s were equally highlighted. 
When illustrating the curbing of inflation in the ‘90s, monetary authorities themselves 
underlined the importance of fiscal and income policy measures. In the final 
considerations read in May 1996, Governor Fazio stated:  
“Fourteen months ago, at the end of March 1996, the exchange rate of the German 
mark was 1237 liras; the yield of 10-year public securities was 13.5 percent. Yesterday, 
the German mark was worth 1014 liras; the yield of securities was 9.5 percent. The crisis 
was overcome thanks to the correction of public accounts, to wage restraining and to a 
monetary policy, which reduced inflation and stabilized markets."
42 
 
Finally, it can be stated that the important results achieved in terms of curbing of 
inflation during the ‘90s were due to an anti-inflationary manoeuvre based on the 
utilization of three instruments: monetary policy, fiscal policy and income policy. 
This kind of manoeuvre significantly broke away from the experience of the ‘80s 
when the objective of price stability was pursued only by means of the monetary 
policy. Significant income and fiscal policy measures were adopted only following 
the failure of the policy of foreign exchange rate stabilization as shown by the 1992  
crisis. The currency crisis was a traumatic event,  which made the public opinion 
aware of the gap between Italy and the other European countries, and led to the social 
consensus which enabled the Government to adopt effective measures of public 
account re-equilibrium as well as significant income policy measures. The Italian 
case highlights the limits of the monetarist explanation of inflation. The experience in 
the ‘80s makes it possible: a) to state that the restrictive monetary policy was not 
sufficient to induce the public sector to reduce the growth of its deficit and workers to 
slow down labor cost increases; b) to point out the limits of an anti-inflationary 
manoeuvre exclusively based on the monetary policy. On the other hand, the 
experience in the ‘90s shows that an anti-inflationary manoeuvre based on the 
simultaneous recourse to monetary policy, fiscal policy and income policy is 
effective.    
                                                                   
41 Fabiani, Locarno, Oneto and Sestito (1998), p. 46. 
42  BIYR 1996, Final Considerations, p. 28. In the same report it is stated: “The correction of public 
deficit overrun, the agreement on the reform of the pension system, two increases in the discount rate 





This paper had two objectives: a) to show the limits of the monetary interpretation 
of the inflation pattern in Italy in the 1970-1998 period; b ) to propose an alternative 
interpretation. In Part I of this paper, it was stated that in Italy the conditions on 
which the quantitative theory is based did not exist; more specifically, i) the 
exogenous character of money supply did not exist; ii) a significant relationship 
between changes in the money stock and changes in the aggregated demand could not 
be identified. It was also demonstrated that it is not possible to define the intensity of 
the monetary squeeze only on the basis of changes in money quantity. When 
considering also the changes in the financial wealth and in the value of real interest 
rates, it is not possible to conclude that in the ‘90s the monetary policy was more 
restrictive than in the ‘80s. On the basis of the pattern of real interest rates, the 
contrary seems true.  
In Part II, an alternative explanation of inflation on the cost-based inflation theory 
is put forward. This interpretation identifies a discontinuity in the process of inflation 
curbing in the ‘80s and in the ‘90s. The 1992 currency crisis is the episode separating 
the two sub-periods, which differ in relation to the characteristics of the anti-
inflationary manoeuvre. The action implemented in the ‘80s is based only on the 
monetary policy; instead, the manoeuvre in the ‘90s is characterized by the recourse 
to all three instruments. The experience in the ‘80s highlights the limits of the anti-
inflationary manoeuvre based on the monetary policy only. The 1992 currency crisis 
is to be ascribed not so much to a not sufficiently rigorous monetary policy, but rather 
to the disequilibria resulting from an anti-inflationary manoeuvre exclusively based 
on the monetary policy. The experience in the ‘90s outlines the effectiveness of an 
anti-inflationary action based on the simultaneous recourse to the monetary, fiscal 
and income policies. The fact that significant income and fiscal policy measures were 
adopted only concurrently to and following the 1992 devaluation  - which represented 
the failure of the foreign exchange stabilization p olicy  - shows that the argument 
whereby the decisions of the monetary authorities can condition the behavior of the 
public sector and of workers, is groundless. 
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